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Feature Article*
October 6, 2004
 The 9/11
Commission Report
and In-Building Communications
The following information is a compilation of excerpts taken directly
from The 9/11 Commission Report regarding the failure of
emergency radio communications at the World Trade Center (WTC) during
the rescue attempts on September 11, 2001. This report provides insight
into what went wrong in terms of emergency communications that day, so
that efforts can be made to prevent the same type of problems during
emergency situations in the future. With the threat of terrorist
attacks continuing to
be a major concern, commercial real estate owners need to ask themselves
if their properties are adequately equipped to handle an emergency
response for the safety of their tenants.
The
9/11 Commission Report states that
“It is a fair
inference, given the differing situations in New York City [and at the
Pentagon], that the problems in command, control, and communications
that occurred at both sites will likely recur in any emergency of [a]
similar scale. The task, looking forward, is to enable first
responders to respond in a coordinated manner with the greatest
possible awareness of the situation.”
The 1993 Terrorist
Bombing of the WTC and the Port Authority’s Response
Recall that the World
Trade Center in New York City had been the target of terrorist attacks
before Sept. 11, 2001. On February 26, 1993, a 1500-pound bomb was
detonated on a parking garage ramp beneath the Twin Towers of the WTC.
Six people were killed and about 1000 people were injured. This
incident exposed vulnerabilities in the WTC and New York City’s
emergency preparedness, including this fact from The 9/11 Commission
Report : “…rescue efforts by the Fire Department of New York (FDNY)
were hampered by the inability of its radios to function in buildings as
large as the Twin Towers.“ The report continues:
“The FDNY’s radios
performed poorly during the 1993 WTC bombing for two reasons. First,
the radio signals often did not succeed in penetrating the numerous
steel and concrete floors that separated companies attempting to
communicate; and second, so many different companies were attempting
to use the same point-to-point channel that communications became
unintelligible.”
In 1994, the Port
Authority installed (at its own expense) a repeater system to enhance
FDNY radio communications in the difficult high-rise environment of the
Twin Towers. It was recommended that the repeater system be kept on at
all times. However, the FDNY requested that the repeater system be
turned on only when it was actually needed because the channel could
cause interference with other FDNY operations in Lower Manhattan.
The repeater system was
installed at the Port Authority police desk in Building 5 of the WTC.
It was decided that the system would be activated by members of the Port
Authority police when the FDNY units that responded to the WTC complex
asked that it be activated. However, in the spring of 2000, the FDNY
asked that an activation console for the repeater system be placed at
the fire-safety desk in the lobby of each of the towers, making FDNY
personnel entirely responsible for its activation. The Port Authority
complied.
Communications Problems on September 11, 2001
According to The 9/11 Commission Report,
“Almost immediately
after the South Tower was hit, senior FDNY chiefs in the North Tower
lobby huddled to discuss strategy for the operations in the two
towers. Of particular concern to the chiefs—in light of FDNY
difficulties in responding to the 1993 bombing—was communications
capability. One of the chiefs recommended testing the repeater
channel to see if it would work. Earlier, an FDNY chief had asked
building personnel to activate the repeater channel, which would
enable greatly enhanced FDNY portable radio communications in the
high-rises. One button on the repeater system activation console in
the North Tower was pressed at 8:54 (a.m.), though it is unclear by
whom. As a result of this activation, communication became possible
between FDNY portable radios on the repeater channel. In addition,
the repeater’s master handset at the fire safety desk could hear
communications made by FDNY portable radios on the repeater channel.
The activation of transmission on the master handset required,
however, that a second button be pressed. That second button was
never activated on the morning of September 11.”
”At 9:05 (a.m.), FDNY chiefs tested the WTC complex’s repeater
system. Because the second button had not been activated, the chief
on the master handset could not transmit. Because the repeater
channel seemed inoperable—the master handset appeared unable to
transmit or receive communications—the chiefs in the North Tower lobby
decided not to use it.”
However,,it seems that
the repeater system was working, at least partially, because portable
FDNY radios and firefighters were able to use repeater channel 7 in the
South Tower. According to one of the chiefs in the lobby of the
North Tower, “One of the most critical things in a major operation
like this is to have information. We didn’t have a lot of information
coming in. We didn’t receive any reports of what was seen from the
[NYPD] helicopters. It was impossible to know how much damage was done
on the upper floors and whether the stairwells were intact or not.”
According to another
FDNY chief who was present, “People watching on TV certainly had more
knowledge of what was happening a hundred floors above us than we did in
the lobby. . . . [W]ithout critical information coming in . . . it’s
very difficult to make informed, critical decisions[.]”
As fire units climbed
higher, their ability to communicate with chiefs on tactical 1 became
more limited and sporadic, both because of the limited effectiveness of
FDNY radios in high-rises and because so many units on tactical 1 were
trying to communicate at the same time. When attempting to reach a
specific fire unit, FDNY chiefs in the lobby often heard nothing in
response.
Based on the
information in the Report, no FDNY chiefs who were at stations outside
the South Tower realized that the repeater channel was functioning and
being used by fire units in the South Tower. Therefore, the senior
chief in the South Tower lobby was unable to communicate his requests
for more fire units to chiefs either in the North Tower lobby or at the
outdoor command post. From about 9:21 (a.m.), the ascending
battalion chief was unable to reach the South Tower lobby command post
because the senior chief in the lobby had stopped communicating on
repeater channel 7. The vast majority of units that entered the South
Tower did not communicate on the repeater channel.
Conclusions
The emergency response effort escalated with the crash of United
Airlines Flight 175 into the South Tower. With that escalation,
command, communications, and control became more critical and
increasingly difficult. First responders assisted thousands of
civilians in evacuating the towers. However, for several reasons, other
firefighters did not receive the evacuation transmissions—one reason
being that some FDNY radios didn’t pick up the transmission because of
the difficulties of radio communications in high-rises.
At the Pentagon, with respect to communications, The 9/11 Commission
Report concludes:
“Almost all aspects
of communications continue to be problematic, from initial
notification to tactical operations. Cellular telephones were of
little value. . . Radio channels were initially oversaturated. . .
Pagers, when available and used, seemed to be the most reliable means
of notification but most firefighters are not issued pagers.”
The success of the New
York Police Department’s radio communications is attributable to a
combination of (1) the strength of the radios, (2) the relatively small
numbers of individuals using the radios, and (3) all personnel using the
correct channel. The same three factors worked against successful
communication among FDNY personnel. (1) the effectiveness of the radios
was drastically reduced in the high-rise environment, (2) tactical
channel 1 was overwhelmed by the number of units that attempted to
communicate on it at 10:00 (a.m.), and (3) some firefighters were on the
wrong channel, or they lacked radios altogether. The report states
that:
“The task of
accounting for and coordinating the units was rendered difficult, if
not impossible, by internal communications breakdowns resulting from
the limited capabilities of radios in the high-rise environment of the
WTC and from confusion over which personnel were assigned to which
frequency… The FDNY’s inability to coordinate and account for the
different radio channels that would be used in an emergency of this
scale contributed to the early lack of units in the South Tower, whose
lobby chief initially could not communicate with anyone outside that
tower.”
The Report concludes
that the technical failure of FDNY radios was “a contributing factor”
(although not cited as the primary cause) of the many firefighter
fatalities in the North Tower.
CRE Partners will be
publishing “Part II” of this topic, entitled “Emergency Communications
Solutions for Office Buildings”. Look for this information in an
upcoming CRE Partners Newsletter.
*CRE Partners is not responsible for the content, validity,
technical accuracy or other claims or information contained in this
article. Feature Articles are often authored by outside sources
and do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of CRE Partners.
Further, publication of articles in the CRE Partners Newsletter and/or
web site is not meant to represent, promote, or endorse any company,
brand, product or solution.
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